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New Reform Strategies and Welfare Participation in Canada 
 
Section 1: Introduction 
During the 1990s, the Canadian welfare system transformed from a relatively 
homogeneous, nationally administered system to a decentralized mix of province-specific 
welfare programs that generated substantial heterogeneity in the composition and timing of 
policy changes aimed at reducing the number of welfare recipients.  Passage of The Canada 
Health and Social Transfer (CHST) in 1996, which implemented a block grant funding system 
and removed federal rules about how provinces manage their welfare systems, was a major event 
in this process of decentralization.1  This paper seeks to exploit the statistical variation generated 
by these 10 natural experiments brought about by changes in provincial welfare policies to 
measure the effects of new reform strategies on welfare participation.2  We use variation in the 
                                                 
1
 A key aspect of CHST that differentiated the Canadian experience of welfare decentralization from the U.S.’s was 
that the US law (the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act, or PRWORA) mandated a 
specific set of new reform strategies—time limits and sanctions for non-compliance to work requirements—as 
federal law.  In addition, states were constrained in their ability to lower welfare benefit levels and were required to 
have 25 percent of their caseload participating in work-related activity.  Thus, while states were given freedom in 
other policy areas, such as earnings exemptions and diversion strategies, federal work participation mandates meant 
that similar sets of policy changes went into effect across the 50 states shortly after the passage of PRWORA in 
1996.  In contrast, Canada’s decentralization had, at its core, no federally mandated initiatives specifically aimed at 
reducing welfare use or incentivizing work.  This allowed for greater differences in the combinations of policy 
changes that were undertaken across provinces and substantial differences in their timing.  
2
 Welfare refers to government programs that provide cash benefits to individuals with low incomes. In Canada, 
welfare is officially referred to as social assistance.  Welfare participation is measured in this paper as the fraction of 
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substance and implementation dates of provinces'  mixes of new reform strategies to estimate 
these policies' effects on the rate of welfare participation, aggregated at the level of province-
years, and estimated using province and year fixed effects, 1986 to 2005, while controlling for 
provincial-level differences in benefit levels, economic growth, unemployment, labor market 
policy variables, and demographic characteristics. 
We classify policy tools for controlling welfare participation into two categories to 
differentiate the standard tools that have been studied extensively in the extant literature from 
four new reform strategies that were implemented during decentralization as provinces took 
greater control over the design and implementation of welfare policy.  The label standard tools 
refers to benefits reductions and the tightening of eligibility requirements, which are perhaps the 
most direct way for governments to try reducing welfare use.  Until 1993, differences among 
provinces’ welfare policies were largely restricted to different benefit levels and eligibility 
requirements.  In contrast, the label new reform strategies refers to four policy tools that emerged 
more recently in one or more provinces: work requirements with sanctions for non-compliance, 
diversion of would-be welfare recipients to alternative sources of support, earnings exemptions 
to encourage work, and time limits that cap the duration for which recipients can receive 
benefits.3  The primary goal of this paper is to use the rich heterogeneity afforded by Canada’s 
                                                                                                                                                             
a province’s non-elderly adult population receiving welfare benefits in a given year.  More detail on data sources 
and the definition of these variables appears in Section 2. 
3
 The adjective “new” is slightly misleading in the case of earnings exemptions in Canada, since some provinces 
experimented with them decades earlier and all provinces had some form of earnings exemptions in place allowing 
welfare recipients who earned labor income to keep some positive fraction (relative to the extreme of a 100 percent 
tax of labor market earnings).  The main reason for classifying earnings exemptions under the “new reform 
strategies” label is to follow convention based on welfare reform studies using US data.  Prior to passage of 
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multiple natural experiments to measure the effect of new reform strategies on welfare 
participation.4   
Effects of benefit levels and eligibility requirements on welfare participation have been 
studied extensively, although without coalescing to a consensus concerning whether these effects 
(in comparison with labor market conditions and exogenous macroeconomic shocks) are 
important determinants of welfare participation.  Allen (1993) documents that differences in 
benefit levels and asset exemption levels among provinces have significant effects on welfare 
participation.  Dooley’s (1999) longitudinal study of single mothers similarly finds that benefit 
levels relative to labor market wages (together with controls for age and family structure) explain 
a large share of variation in welfare participation decisions among this important subpopulation.  
Christofides (2000) and Christofides, Stengos and Swidinsk (1997), however, argue that changes 
in wage rates and personal characteristics are perhaps more important than changes in benefit 
levels and the other welfare policy variables that they considered using two-equation models of 
labor supply and welfare participation.  Finnie, Irvine and Sceviour (2004) similarly argue that 
individual attributes explain Canadians’ decisions to take up welfare better than do changes in 
the standard tools of welfare reform.  Klassen and Buchanan (1997) focus on eligibility 
                                                                                                                                                             
PRWORA in 1996, labor market earnings of long term welfare participants in the U.S. were taxed at 100 percent, 
creating a strong disincentive to work.  At least in the U.S. context, earnings exemptions can be regarded as one of 
the important new reform strategies put forward by advocates of welfare reform.   
4
 As early as Gorlick and Brethour (1998), social scientists were documenting dramatic changes in Canada’s welfare 
system and the concomitant introduction of new reform strategies (notably, work requirements).  Since Gorlick and 
Brethour, a wide-ranging group of researchers from different disciplines and with distinct perspectives have 
contributed to documenting  the heterogeneity and novelty of new reform strategies as defined in this paper (e.g., 
Morel, 2002; Wallace, Klein, and Reitsma-Street, 2006; Maxwell, 2009; Saulnier, 2009). 
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requirements and find that labor market conditions rather than policy variables drive welfare 
participation rates.  Additional studies concerning benefit levels and eligibility requirements have 
contributed greatly to establishing empirical regularities linking these standard tools for 
controlling welfare participation to other important economic outcomes (Charette and Meng, 
1994; Fortin, Lacroix and Drolet, 2004; Arnau, Fortin and Cremieux, 2005; Card and Hyslop, 
2005; Card and Robins, 2005; Lemieux and Milligan, 2008).5    
Turning now to new reform strategies, relatively little econometric analysis exploiting the 
valuable statistical variation afforded by heterogeneity in provinces’ adoption of new policies has 
appeared.6  One reason for this may be that the very heterogeneity that makes new reform 
strategies potentially rich with relevant information also presents a formidable challenge: How to 
code diverse laws, enforcement practices, and timing profiles in a concise, yet comprehensive 
manner that can be included as an explanatory variable in an otherwise standard econometric 
framework?  This paper takes up the task of coding these new-to-Canada welfare reforms that 
appeared mostly in the 1990s and estimating their effects on welfare participation. 
                                                 
5
 An overlapping set of questions about the determinants of welfare participation have been investigated extensively 
using US data (e.g., Blank, 2001, 2002; Acs, Phillips and Nelsen, 2005; Ribar, 2005).  In the context of our focus on 
new reform strategies, the US literature on time limits, which is one of the toughest and most controversial of the 
new reform strategies, is particularly relevant (Grogger, Haider and Klerman, 2003; Grogger, 2004).   
6
 Green and Warburton (2004) studied the effects of diversion policies using a randomized policy experiment in 
British Columbia and found no evidence of long-run effectiveness of this policy tool.  Shannon (2009) coded 
Canadian provinces into categories that distinguish aggressive from non-aggressive reformers, but in the context of 
explaining labor supply decisions.  Using US data, Danielson and Klerman (2008) coded the same four policies that 
we define as new reform strategies.  The present study draws inspiration from these studies’ coding techniques and 
their focus on new reform strategies, attempting to adapt these approaches to model Canadian welfare participation 
within a standard econometric framework.   
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Table 1 presents a more detailed view of the new reform strategies, their variegated 
combinations among provinces and heterogeneous dates of implementation.  The information in 
Table 1 is the result of our attempts to assiduously collect source material from 10 provincial 
welfare agencies, and multiple other sources, summarizing new reform strategies (i.e., welfare 
policies other than benefit levels and eligibility requirements) put in place since 1986.  Table 1 
shows that many provinces pursued some type of new reform strategy, but that stringency of 
sanctions used to enforce work requirements and the aggressiveness of diversion tactics varied in 
important ways, as recorded in the column headings that distinguish weak from strong versions 
of work requirements and diversion.  According to Table 1, three provinces stand out as 
relatively aggressive in implementing stringent combinations of new reform strategies: Alberta, 
British Columbia, and Ontario.7  The econometric models of welfare participation at the heart of 
this paper include variables that code the information in Table 1 together with variables 
measuring benefit levels, eligibility requirements, labor market policy variables (i.e., minimum 
wage and unemployment benefits), macroeconomic shocks, and annual measures of province-
specific demographic composition.      
 The major questions we attempt to address concern the effect of new reform strategies 
on rates of welfare participation relative to other frequently studied factors thought to influence 
welfare participation.  The comparisons are threefold.  First, we compare the effect of new 
reform strategies relative to the effect sizes of benefit levels and eligibility requirements in 
explaining reductions in welfare participation that took place from 1994 to 2005.  New reform 
strategies turn out to be at least as important as benefit levels and eligibility requirements in 
                                                 
7
 A detailed account of welfare policy in each province and source material used in coding the new reform strategies 
in Table 1 can be found in Appendix A (“An Overview of Canadian Welfare Reform”). 
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explaining observed declines in welfare participation.  Second, we quantify the effect size of new 
reform strategies relative to minimum wage and unemployment insurance benefits.  New reform 
strategies turn out to be at least as important as welfare benefits levels, and at least an order of 
magnitude more important than eligibility requirements, in contributing to observed declines in 
welfare participation.   Differences across provinces and over time in the real minimum wage 
had almost no effect.  And, according to all the empirical models, declining unemployment 
benefits induced more people to participate in welfare (substituting out of less attractive 
unemployment benefits) all else equal. Finally, we compare effect sizes of new reform strategies 
against the good luck of random macroeconomic fluctuations (for which policy makers would 
have a more difficult time claiming responsibility) proxied here by real GDP growth, 
unemployment, and lags of both these variables.  GDP growth has no statistically significant 
effects, but provinces’ unemployment rates have powerful effects, accounting for a quarter to 
half ofthe decline in welfare participation.  
The paper proceeds as follows.  Section 2 describes patterns in welfare use in Canada at 
the national and provincial levels and presents data on benefits reductions, macroeconomic 
fluctuations, and new reform strategies as competing information sources for explaining the 
dramatic reductions in welfare use that nearly all observers agree took place from the mid 1990s 
through 2005.  Section 2 also describes the methodology for classifying province-year 
combinations as having new reform strategies in effect.  Section 3 presents the data and 
empirical models of welfare participation.  Section 4 presents estimated results from these 
empirical models: those with province and year fixed effects, with different versions of the 
variable coding new reform strategies, and data-filtering techniques for extracting trends, 
conducting robustness checks, and identifying which among new reform strategies had the 
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largest effects.  The findings in Section 4 are intended to address the questions posed in the 
introduction concerning the relative magnitude of new reform strategies’ effects relative to other 
factors influencing welfare use.  Finally, Section 5 concludes with a discussion and interpretation 
of the empirical findings.8  This document makes reference to numerous appendices 
documenting: data sources and institutional details used to code new reform strategies (Appendix 
A); supplementary descriptive statistics and empirical models (Appendix B, C, D, H1, H2, H3, 
NR, and R); and figures that guided certain modeling choices and interpretations of the 
quantitative findings (Appendix AG, HP1-HP4, P, and WB). These appendices are not intended 
for publication due to space considerations and are instead posted online.9     
 
Section 2: Why Did Welfare Participation Fall in Canada?  
Changes in Welfare Participation in Canada and its Provinces10 
                                                 
8
 Contextualizing our findings is challenging given the divergence among previous findings.  Previous studies that 
measure effects of new reform strategies in Canada or the U.S. have come to different conclusions.  Hughes and 
McCuaig (2000) study programs that send welfare recipients to work as child care workers, providing cautionary 
evidence about difficult-to-anticipate challenges that new reform strategies may face.   In the U.S context, Ziliak, 
Figlio, Davis and Connolly’s (2000) analysis of US state-level welfare caseloads attributes virtually all observed 
declines after 1996 to macroeconomic fluctuations rather than policy changes under the heading of welfare reform.  
Not every technique for measuring effect sizes for new policies produces the same answer, however, as Swann 
(2005), for example, reports rather strong evidence that work requirements and time limits lead to large declines in 
welfare use.   
9
 http://www.utdallas.edu/~nberg/Berg_ARTICLES/APPENDICES-Berg-Gabel-2010-10-11.pdf 
10
 The period study for the data and empirical models analyzed subsequently is the 20 years from 1986 to 2005.  At 
the time of writing, Canada’s National Council of Welfare had published welfare participation counts broken out by 
province only through 2005.  Another transition that occurred around this time was the split of the CHST into the 
Canada Health Transfer (CHT) and the Canada Social Transfer (CST). 
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Figure 1 disaggregates welfare participation into time paths for each province, which 
vary considerably both in level and slope11 Welfare participation reached a peak in all provinces 
between 1993 and 1997.  The subsequent declines were nearly monotonic, although the levels 
and rates of decline were markedly different.  Table 2 computes percentage declines in welfare 
participation by province, from 1994 (the year in which Canada’s national rate of welfare 
participation peaked) to 2005.  Despite heterogeneity among provinces’ approaches to welfare 
reform emphasized earlier in Table 1, every province experienced large declines in welfare 
participation.  Table 2 shows that Alberta declined by more than 66 percent while Newfoundland 
declined by less than 18 percent.  Ontario had by far the largest percentage-point reduction, 
dropping a remarkable 8.6 percentage points.   
Changes in Welfare Benefits 
Table 3 shows percentage declines in real welfare benefits which occurred in nearly all 
provinces’ formulas for paying benefits to the three most common kinds of households.12  Each 
province has its own formula for mapping the household structure of a welfare-eligible 
individual into a benefit level.  Household structure sometimes raises conundrums of 
classification, especially the designation “single.”  Following the National Council of Welfare’s 
interpretation of this term, single refers to an adult living at an address with no other adults living 
                                                 
11
 Welfare participation data from the National Council of Welfare (2003, 2006) is computed annually as the fraction 
of the non-elderly population in each province receiving welfare in March of a given year.  See Appendix AG for 
nationally aggregated welfare participation overlaid with GDP growth and the unemployment rate. 
12
 The percentage versus levels distinction matters qualitatively for some comparisons because benefit levels for 
single adults with no children are generally much smaller than benefit levels for single or coupled parents with 
dependent children.  In provinces like British Columbia and Ontario, benefits for Single, No Child individuals were 
cut more than for Single, One Child households in percentage terms, but the same or less in dollar terms.  
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at the same address.  By this definition, the label “single” provides no definitive information 
about marital- or relationship status, although one presumes it correlates with being unmarried 
and, perhaps more weakly, with having no partner to provide financial support and assist in 
raising children.  Similarly, the designation coupled refers to an adult living at an address with 
precisely one other adult. 
Some provinces such as British Columbia, Ontario and Saskatchewan reduced benefits 
fairly evenly across different household structures.  Alberta, Manitoba, New Brunswick, and 
Prince Edward Island, on the other hand, cut benefits for childless welfare recipients (listed in 
Table 3 under the column labeled Single, No Child) by at least twice as much as for Single 
Parent, One Child households.  Despite the overall trend of benefits reductions, Newfoundland 
raised real benefits for Single, No Child individuals by a remarkable 45 percent, while hardly 
adjusting real benefits for the other two household structures over the same 11-year period.13   
Overall, these large declines in benefits show that the standard tool of benefit reductions 
was aggressively used.  If benefit level reductions explained the entire decline in welfare 
participation, then we should be able to put variables measuring the new reform strategy 
                                                 
13
 According to the National Council of Welfare, Newfoundland’s unusual rise in benefits levels for the childless 
arose due to a shift between two rather extreme shifts in policy (NCW, 2003), and thanks to personal 
communication with D. Richard (February 9, 2010), Researcher and Policy Advisor at the National Council of 
Welfare.  LexisNexis searches for news accounts of radical changes in welfare benefits in Newfoundland during this 
period did not uncover any stories in the local press about dramatic cuts, suggesting the possibility of a discrepancy 
between reported benefits levels and practice in the field.  Inspecting Newfoundland’s benefit levels time series year 
by year, one finds that the province reduced benefits for Single, No Child recipients between 1996 and 1999.  
Thereafter, the province repeatedly raised benefit levels for Single, No Child individuals, reaching what is as of 
2005 (and at the time of writing) the highest level for this household structure across all provinces. 
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variables side-by-side in a regression with fluctuating benefits as controls and expect the policy 
coefficient to be roughly zero.  If, on the other hand, new reform strategies made a substantive 
difference in reducing welfare participation rates across Canada, then we should see large 
coefficients on this variable that codes the new reform strategies, even in the presence of the 
benefit levels controls.   
The multiple household structures in Table 3 raises the question of which benefit levels to 
include as controls in the empirical model presented in the next section.  The models we report 
subsequently use welfare benefits for Single Parent, One Child as a proxy for all fluctuations in 
benefit levels.  As Table 3 shows, any scalar-valued proxy will be imperfect because benefit 
levels did not fluctuate uniformly among different household structures.   According to Human 
Resources and Skills Development Canada (HRSDC, 2006), 61 percent of all adult welfare 
recipients in 2005 (excluding the disabled) had Single, No Child household status, while 21 
percent were single with at least one child, and 10 percent were coupled with at least one child.  
Based on representativeness of the population of Canadian welfare recipients, one could easily 
argue that it makes more sense to use benefit levels for Single, No Child households, or a 
weighted average.  Two points argued in favor of our approach of using Single, One Child 
benefits, however.  A 45 percent increase in benefits for childless welfare recipients (which 
coincided with every other province reducing benefits by 10 to 35 percent) makes Newfoundland 
a troublingly influential outlier.  Pair-wise correlation between Single, No Child and Single, One 
Child benefits is 0.70 when Newfoundland is excluded (with 180 observations from 9 provinces 
observed over 20 years) and just 0.38 when included (with 200 observations).  A second reason 
to focus on benefit levels for single parents is that this household type tends to have longer spells 
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on welfare (Barrett and Cragg, 1998) and per-case costs are therefore much larger.14  Appendix 
WB shows annual time paths of each province’s welfare benefit levels for a Single Parent, One 
Child household, revealing nice variation across provinces and through time. 
Changes in Eligibility Requirements 
Eligibility requirements such as means tests, asset exemption limits, age restrictions on 
teenage recipients, and residency requirements are policy tools for influencing welfare 
participation rates.15  Unfortunately, there are insufficient data to code the numerous dimensions 
in which provinces vary in their welfare eligibility requirements.  As a second best, we use 
provinces’ maximum liquid asset exemption levels expressed in 2007 Canadian dollars as a 
proxy for changes in eligibility rules.  Applicants with liquid assets in excess of this dollar 
amount are not eligible for welfare.  Compared with benefit levels, there is not nearly as much 
year-over-year change in the asset exemptions variable, although when changes do occur, they 
tend to be rather large.16   
New Reform Strategies in the Provinces 
                                                 
14
 In unreported runs of the empirical models introduced subsequently, we tried all three of these benefits levels 
individually as the single benefits proxy in the model and, in some runs, we included both Single, No Child and 
Coupled, Two Children benefits even though this specification suffers from the multicolinearity problem.   
15
 One of the most well known adjustments in eligibility requirements came in 1987, when Ontario passed the 
“spouse in the house” rule that expanded eligibility for welfare by enabling unmarried, cohabitating couples to 
qualify for welfare as single adults for up to three years.  Ontario’s policy was unique among provinces and led to an 
estimated increase of 9,000 single parents made newly eligible for welfare (Holden, 1987), which gives but one 
indication of the potential importance of changes (in both directions) in eligibility requirements.   
16
 For example, British Columbia in 1992 raised asset exemption limits from C$1500 to C$5000 (in nominal terms) 
after having left them unchanged for six years, and later reduced the exemption limit to C$2500 in 2002. 
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Despite the substantial variation in benefit levels and eligibility requirements, a case can 
be made based on documentary evidence (NCW, 1997; Gorlick and Brethour, 1998), that the real 
action in Canada in terms of welfare-related policy change was generated by provinces’ 
experimentation with new welfare reform strategies (i.e., work requirements with sanctions, 
diversion, earnings exemptions, and time limits).  Recall that Table 1 (discussed in the 
Introduction) summarizes new reform strategies put in place in various combinations and in 
different years. 
Work Requirements 
Work requirements refer to policies that require welfare participants to search for work, 
participate in job training programs, volunteer, or hold a job in the private or public sector.  
Typically, welfare participants are required to regularly document job search, training, and work 
activities.  Failure to comply can, in some province-years, result in sanctions.  Provincial policies 
differ in terms of whether and how much a welfare participant loses for failing to comply with 
work requirements.  Work requirements are classified as Weak if sanctions for non-compliance 
require forfeiting a fraction of the benefit payment (often $100 or less according to sanctions 
policies in provinces with Weak work requirements).  Work requirements are considered Strong 
if welfare participants face losing 100 percent of the welfare benefits for non-compliance.17  
Another dimension of the stringency of work requirements described in the notes in Table 1 
concerns how easy it is for recipients facing sanctions to appeal, and whether welfare case 
workers have discretion to not impose sanctions.   
                                                 
17
 Newfoundland and Quebec (with the exception of the years 1990 through 1994) had work requirement policies 
with no sanctions to punish non-compliant participants, and are therefore coded as having no work requirement at 
all. 
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Diversion 
 The next policy tool coded in Table 1 as a new reform strategy is diversion, referring to 
policies that seek to reduce the number of potential welfare applicants who complete applications 
for welfare by diverting would-be welfare participants to tap other sources of income instead. 
The rationale for diversion is straightforward: to save the welfare system money over the long 
term by reducing the number of people who end up as long-term welfare participants, even if it 
incurs up-front costs.  Table 1 classifies diversion as Weak if the policy is primarily an 
information campaign notifying would-be welfare applicants of work opportunities, their 
eligibility for other government programs (e.g., unemployment insurance), or spousal and/or 
family support that they are already entitled to collect (especially alimony and child support 
payments).18  Diversion is considered Strong if case workers who screen welfare applicants have 
discretion to do one of the following: offer immediate cash loans or one-time payments (e.g., to 
cover costs of clothing for a job interview; to buy a bus ticket to a neighboring province); 
demand that would-be applicants wait a week or more before completing the application; or 
require would-be applicants to liquidate all assets, move in with relatives, visit food banks, or 
engage in other activities as prerequisites that must be undertaken before the welfare application 
is complete.  The coding in Table 1 does not require that a province engage in all of these to be 
classified as strong diversion as the footnotes in that table explain.  Alberta (since 1993) and 
British Columbia (since 2002), for example, require most welfare applicants to automatically 
wait before a welfare application can be completed.  For example, applicants in British Columbia 
                                                 
18
 Another component of diversion policies is that welfare applicants are required to complete lengthy questionnaires 
and provide extensive documentation to apply for welfare, which raises the implicit cost of applying. 
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are required to document job search during a mandatory three-week waiting period before 
proceeding with an application and receiving the first welfare payment. 
Earning Exemptions 
The third policy tool coded in Table 3 as a new reform strategy is earnings exemptions.  
These are tax incentives that aim to encourage work among welfare participants by exempting 
some portion of labor market earnings from taxes.  There are two parameters that define a 
province’s earnings exemption policy.  First, there is a threshold of earnings that is not taxed at 
all, typically C$100 to C$300 per month (in nominal dollars).  The second parameter is the rate 
of taxation on labor earnings above this threshold.  Table 1 classifies a province as having 
implemented earnings exemptions if it has both a non-zero earnings exemption threshold and a 
tax rate of less than 100 percent.  This binary classification is an admittedly coarse measure, and 
we examine the effects of these parameters separately with a version of the welfare participation 
model in which the new reform strategies policy variable is unbundled into as fine-grained 
components as possible.  Details of provincial earnings exemptions policies are described in 
Appendix A.  
Time Limit 
Finally, time limits refer to policies that stipulate a maximum duration for which benefits 
can be drawn.  Only British Columbia has instituted time limits.  Under British Columbia’s time 
limits policy, a welfare participant can receive benefits for a maximum of two years out of every 
five-year period.19 
                                                 
19
 In the U.S., time limits were first introduced under PRWORA.  The federal law in the U.S. imposes a five-year 
lifetime limit on the receipt of welfare benefits, with some states having enacted lifetime limits as low as two years.  
British Columbia’s revolving five-year window can therefore be thought of as a hybrid policy—not as strict as US 
15 
 
Mapping New Reform Strategies into the Policy Variable: NEWREFORM 
Table 4 shows the mapping from the new reform strategies summarized in Table 1 into a 
policy variable representing province-year combinations in which new reform strategies were in 
effect to be used in subsequent econometric models.  We construct four versions, beginning with 
the most restrictive definition of what it means for a province-year to have new reform strategies 
in effect, labeled NEWREFORM1, and then loosen the criteria gradually (i.e., number and 
stringency of policies in Table 1 that must be in place simultaneously for a province-year to be 
classified as having new reform strategies in effect), constructing successively more inclusive 
versions: NEWREFORM2, NEWREFORM3 and NEWREFORM4.  All of these are indicator 
variables that “turn on” (from 0 to 1) to indicate province-year combinations in which criteria, 
specified in detail below, are met.   
NEWREFORM 1 requires that a province-year has three or more reform policies from 
Table 1 simultaneously in effect, excluding weak work requirements and weak diversion.  
NEWREFORM1 is the main explanatory variable in the regression results reported below, and 
we feel that it best distinguishes the province-years where substantially novel policies were 
implemented (Alberta from 1993 on, British Columbia from 2002 on, and Ontario from 1996 
on).20  NEWREFORM2 defines new reform strategy province-years slightly more inclusively, 
indicating province-years with three or more reform policies (weak or strong) in effect.  
                                                                                                                                                             
limits, but stricter than other Canadian provinces that have no limits on the length of time one can receive welfare 
benefits. 
20
 This version of the policy variable also most closely tracks with the policy bundle that U.S. states are required to 
have in place under PRWORA.  Thus, NEWREFORM1 can be regarded as an indicator for province-years in which 
US-style reforms were in effect.  Unlike the US, however, NEWREFORM1 distinguishes sharply among provinces, 
since most province-years, even post-1996, are not indicated as having new reform strategies in effect. 
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NEWREFORM3 indicates province-years in which any form of work requirement was in effect.  
Finally, NEWREFORM4 is the crudest and most inclusive measure of new reform strategies, 
switching from 0 to 1 in all provinces in 1996 to mark Canada’s federal enactment of the CHST, 
giving provinces new autonomy over welfare policy.  NEWREFORM4 is crude in at least two 
ways, and provides a benchmark against which to see what the information added in constructing 
REFORM1 buys us in terms of effect size and variance explained.  REFORM4 does not capture 
differences between provinces’ post-1996 welfare reform policies, nor does it account for 
different dates of implementation across provinces.   
Another potentially important sensitivity we were concerned about was whether, given a 
policy implemented in month m ∈ {1, 2, …, 12} of year t, it matters if we code this as occurring 
in year t or year t +1.  We tried three approaches that turned out to have barely noticeable effects 
on estimated regression coefficients.  The first approach was “aggressive coding” indicating 1 in 
the year of implementation (t) regardless of the month in which it began. Our “intermediate 
coding” approach assigned the value of 0 to the reform variables in years prior to t, a value of 
m/12 in year t, and a value of 1 in all years after t.  Finally, the “conservative coding” approach 
assigned 1 to the reform variable in year t +1and 0 prior to that.  None of these variations in the 
coding of the policy variable had substantial effects, whether mid-year dates of implementation 
were considered to be in force retroactively from the beginning of the year, fractionally 
throughout the year, or only the following year. 
 
Section 3: Data and Statistical Models of Welfare Participation 
 
Data Sources 
Data on welfare participation, welfare benefit levels, as well as earnings and asset 
exemptions, were obtained from the National Council of Welfare (1987) and its Welfare Incomes 
17 
 
series published nearly every year from 1990 through 2008.21  Provincial population data, 
demographics, unemployment rates, real GDP, and unemployment insurance transfers22 were 
provided by numerous data files compiled by Statistics Canada.23  Finally, minimum wage rates 
were obtained from the Minimum Wage Database compiled by Human Resources and Skills 
Development Canada (2009). 
Summary Statistics 
Table 5 presents summary statistics for variables used in subsequent regression models.  
The number of observations is 200, resulting from 10 provinces observed over 20 years.  The 
dependent variable is welfare participation, measured as the fraction of the non-elderly 
population counted as welfare participants in each province-year, labeled PARTICIPATION, 
ranging from a minimum of 1.97 percent (Alberta in 2002 and 2005) to a maximum of 15.27 
percent (Newfoundland in 1997).  The macroeconomic variables UNEMPLOYMENT and 
REALGDPGROWTH show a wide range of fluctuation, which is of course beneficial for the 
precision of estimated regression coefficients.  The empirical models will include lagged 
versions of the two macroeconomic variables, not listed as separate rows in Table 5 because 
lagged variables have nearly identical empirical and identical asymptotic distributions.  
NEWREFORM1 indicates that 13 percent of province-years have new reform strategies in 
effect, according to the most stringent criteria matching welfare policy in the U.S. after 1996.  
                                                 
21
 Unfortunately, we were not able to find usable data across all province-years in our sample measuring the 
proportion of welfare participants who are disabled. 
22
 Canadian data sources use the term “employment insurance” in place of “unemployment insurance.” 
23
 Statistics Canada data files used in building the data sets for this paper are: Provincial Economic Accounts, 
Income Trends in Canada 1976 to 2007, CANSIM database tables 051—0012, 051—0020, 051—0012, 276—0001, 
282—0086, 384—0009, and the Labour Force Survey (Statistics Canada, 2007, 2009, 2010a,  2010b). 
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The gradual loosening of the criteria used to define variations on the coding of our main policy 
variable can be seen in the increasing coverage of province-years: 13, 24, 42 and 49 percent.  
The variable measuring variation in welfare benefits in Table 5 is labeled 
logBENEFITS_SINGLE_ONECHILD and ranges from 9.46 to 10.00, slightly more than 50 log-
approximated percentage points.  The variable logASSET_THRESH proxies for provinces’ 
different eligibility requirements, with higher asset thresholds indicating more lenient eligibility 
rules.  Its range of variation of 2.28 (= 9.35-7.07) is substantially larger than for the benefits 
variable, translating to approximately 228 percentage points relative to the mean.  Provincial 
minimum wage rates have been deflated to real terms and logged to form the variable 
logMINWAGE, with a range of variation similar to that of the welfare benefits variable.  The 
variable logUNEMP_INS is the annual unemployment insurance transfer for a non-elderly out-
of-work Canadian in a particular province-year (assuming an unemployed worker draws the 
benefit for an entire 12 months) deflated to constant 2007 dollars and then logged.   
The proportion of the non-elderly population who are single parents is measured by the 
variable SINGLEPARENTS, presumably controlling for additional information regarding 
exogenous differences in demand for welfare.  The interprovincial rate of migration (i.e., the net 
number of people moving into each province as a fraction of the destination province’s non-
elderly population) is given by MIGRATION, while education outcomes are approximated by 
high school dropout rates, labeled DROPOUT.   A province with more formal education has, one 
presumes, more skills and is therefore less likely to require welfare (Coelli, Green and 
Warburton, 2007).  The variable ELDERLY records the ratio of the number of over-65 to 65-or-
under residents in each province-year.  Two countervailing effects are possible: a province with a 
greater than average ratio of elderly residents might provide additional childcare services 
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enabling working-age people with children to work more, or the elderly might represent another 
demand on the time of working-age people, reducing the chance of labor market participation 
(and increasing the chance of welfare participation).  The number of non-permanent residents per 
non-elderly person in a given province-year is measured by NONPERM_RESIDENTS, which 
includes people claiming refugee status; people holding a study, work or Minister’s permit; 
and/or a non-Canadian-born dependant of a non-permanent resident.24 
Empirical Models 
We build up the empirical models successively, beginning with a relatively small, 
exclusively macroeconomic benchmark model consisting of real GDP growth and the 
unemployment rate—contemporaneously and with two lags each—for a total of 2x3 = 6 
variables in addition to a constant: 
Model A:  Yit = α +  Mit’µ + εit, 
 where Yit represents the welfare participation rate in province i at time t; Mit represents the 6x1 
vector of province-specific GDP growth and unemployment with two lags (using similar 
indexing throughout: i indicating provinces and t indicating time periods, i = 1,…,10; t = 
1,…,20); Mit’ represents the transpose of Mit; µ is a 6x1 vector of coefficients on the 
macroeconomic variables; εit represents unobserved heterogeneity, assumed to have zero mean 
and a block diagonal variance matrix that allows for within-province correlation while assuming 
between-province independence; and α is the coefficient on the constant. 
                                                 
24
 Appendix R ranks the provinces according to each of the variables listed in Table 5, confirming several 
stereotypes and generating surprises as well.  Appendix V provides a variables list with detailed descriptions of all 
variables in Table 5. 
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Next, we include the main explanatory variable, NEWREFORM1it, which captures 
between-province and intertemporal variation in new reform strategies.  We will adopt an abuse 
of notation by specifying models that re-use Greek symbols which should be demarcated with 
distinct symbols.  This elision of substantive differences (i.e., the fact that error terms and 
coefficients in different models are distinct mathematical objects) aids in seeing the construction 
of the model.  Model B (with macro variables and new reform strategies) is as follows: 
Model B:  Yit = α +  Mit’µ + NEWREFORM1it ρ + εit, 
where ρ  is a scalar valued coefficient on NEWREFORM1, and all other symbols represent 
analogously defined quantities although, of course, quantitatively distinct from previous and 
future models that re-use symbols. 
 Model C adds to Model B four additional policy variables denoted by the 4x1 vector Pit, 
which contains: logASSET_THRESHit, logBENEFITS_SINGLE_ONECHILDit, 
logMINWAGEit  and logUNEMP_INS it: 
Model C:  Yit = α +  Mit’µ + NEWREFORM1it ρ + Pit’pi + εit, 
where pi is a 4x1 vector of coefficients measuring the expected change in welfare participation 
from a one-unit change in a policy variable. 
 Next, we add five pieces of information about the demographic composition of each 
province-year, denoted by the 5x1 vector Dit, which stacks the variables: SINGLEPARENTSit, 
MIGRATIONit, DROPOUTit, ELDERLYit, and NONPERM_RESIDENTSit: 
Model D:  Yit = α +  Mit’µ + NEWREFORM1it ρ + Pit’pi + Ditκ+ εit, 
where κ is a 5x1 vector of coefficients measuring the effect on welfare participation of a one-unit 
change in demographic composition.   
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We construct a set of province fixed effects, denoted Lit (for location) and coded as a 9x1 
vector of indicator variables for all provinces other than Alberta (which, as the province with the 
largest percent reduction in welfare participation, serves as the left-out reference class).  The 
fixed effect indicator variables are multiplied by the corresponding vector of coefficients λ, the 
product of which can be added to all previous models (labeled “+FE” for fixed effects) to control 
for province-specific differences not captured so far.  For example, the model D+FE refers to: 
Model D+FE: Yit = α +  Mit’µ + NEWREFORM1it ρ + Pit’pi + Dit’κ+  Lit’λ + εit, 
Finally, a 19x1 vector of year-specific fixed effects denoted Tit (with year 1 left out as the 
reference class) is multiplied with the corresponding 19x1 vector of constants, τ, which measure 
an arbitrary time trend common across all provinces, the product of which is added to all four 
models (labeled “+FE+YR” for province and year fixed effects.  Thus, the fully encompassing 
model with all regressors, province and year fixed effects is: 
Model D+FE+YR:  Yit = α +  Mit’µ + NEWREFORM1it ρ + Pit’pi + Dit’κ+  Lit’λ + Tit’τ + εit. 
The standard errors of estimated coefficients in these models are computed using 
Arellano’s (1987) clustered covariance matrix (CCM) technique, which assumes that εit is 
uncorrelated across provinces but autocorrelated within province.25  This estimator produces 
noticeably larger standard errors that deflate t statistics and make it more difficult for the model 
to indicate statistical significance.  The reduced likelihood of finding statistical significance is 
desirable because the statistically significant effects that do emerge are conservative in the sense 
of having demanded more from the data to reach significance, substantively (because of large 
effect sizes) and statistically (because of small standard errors).  Under classical assumptions for 
                                                 
25
  Bertrand et al. (2004) caution that, without proper control for autocorrelation, standard  measures of statistical 
significance are misleading.   
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a panel model based on N units observed for T periods and with K regressors, the degrees of 
freedom for t statistics is NT – K – 1.26   
 
Section 4: Regression Results 
Table 6 presents estimated coefficients and t statistics for Models A+FE+YR through 
D+FE+YR (which include both province and year fixed effects).  Model A+FE+YR  shows the 
macroeconomic benchmark model with only unemployment and real GDP (and 2 lags each) in 
addition fixed effects on the right hand side, which produces an R-squared of 87.0.  Model 
A+FE+YR’s coefficients imply that, if unemployment went up by one percentage point for one 
year and then returned to average, then welfare participation would be expected to rise by 0.46 
percentage points contemporaneously, rise by 0.61 (= 0.46 + 0.15) after one year (assuming that 
unemployment returned to its mean after one year), and then rise by 0.74 after two years (= 0.46 
+ 0.15 + 0.13). This implies a roughly three-quarter percentage point rise in welfare participation 
predicted within 2 years for every one percentage point rise in unemployment.  Summing the 
three coefficients for real GDP growth and its two lags yields the prediction that, following a one 
percentage point increase in GDP growth, welfare participation is expected to fall by 0.05 
                                                 
26
 Arellano’s (1987) method is appropriate when N > T.  For the case of the data considered in this paper where N is 
fixed and T > N, however, Hansen (2007) proposes a more conservative measure of degree of freedom, N – 1, when 
using CCM to control for autocorrelation.  Therefore, how one interprets the t statistics in Tables 6 and 7 (presented 
in the next section) depends on the approach taken.  Under classical assumptions of a t distribution with 200-(9+19-
15)-1=156 degrees of freedom (based on 9 province fixed effects, 19 year fixed effects, and 15 other regressors), a t 
value of magnitude 1.65 cuts off a 2-sided 90 percent confidence region; and a t value of magnitude 1.98 cuts off a 
2-sided 95 percent confidence region.  Under Hansen’s more conservative approach with 10 – 1 = 9 degrees of 
freedom, the critical t values are 1.83 and 2.26 for 90 and 95 percent confidence levels, respectively. 
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percentage points within two years. Converting the effects of macroeconomic variables to head 
counts (from a base population of 1,663,000 Canadians who were on welfare in 2005, or 6.1 
percent of Canada’s non-elderly population), a 1 point increase in the rate of unemployment in 
2005 implies that approximately 202,000 Canadians would become welfare participants by the 
end of 2007, and a 1 percentage point increase in GDP growth implies an expected decline of 
approximately 14,000 Canadians exiting the welfare program within two years.  Only 
contemporaneous UNEMPLOYMENT is significant at the 95 percent confidence level.  (See 
Appendices C and D for estimated results based on Models A through D and Models A+FE 
through D+FE.)  
Model B+FE+YR introduces NEWREFORM1 (which measures province-years in which 
new reform strategies were in full effect).  Controlling for macroeconomic factors, Model 
B+FE+RY suggests that the enactment of new reform strategies reduced welfare participation by 
2.16 percentage points, with a large t value.  Relative to the unconditional mean welfare 
participation rate of 8.97 percent (averaging across province-years, not weighted by population), 
new reform strategies reduced welfare participation by 24.0 percent.   
Model C+FE+YR adds other sources of information as competing explanations for the 
observed declines in welfare participation.  Controlling for macroeconomic factors and other 
policy variables (i.e., welfare benefit levels, asset exemption levels, the minimum wage, and 
unemployment benefits), Model C+FE+YR produces nearly as large an effect of new reform 
strategies on welfare participation, but its t statistic of 1.7 is no longer statistically significant 
using Hansen’s recommended 9 degrees of freedom.   The effect size is economically significant, 
translating into a 21 percent reduction and hundreds of thousands of Canadians prevented from 
participating in welfare. 
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As Table 6 shows, Model D+FE+YR adds demographic controls.  Contrary to what one 
might expect, the fraction of single parents—as a source of inter-province variation in the 
demand for welfare—as well as migratory population flows does not noticeably reduce the effect 
size of NEWREFORM1.  The effect of new reform strategies on expected welfare participation 
remains economically significant at -1.91 percentage points but, again, with statistical precision 
that depends on one’s interpretation of the t statistic whose magnitude is 1.7 (with p-value 0.12, 
or 88 percent confidence, under the assumption of a t distribution with 9 degrees of freedom).   
Table 7 presents regression coefficients on four different versions of the variable that 
codes whether new reform strategies were in effect.  Models B through D are variations on the 
inclusion of additional policy variables and demographic controls.  Table 7 facilitates a 
comparison policy variation coded in NEWREFORM1 with successively more inclusive (i.e., 
less demanding) criteria for a province-year to be counted as having new reform strategies in 
place.  We estimate variations of models B, C and D using four versions of the policy variable: 
NEWREFORM1, NEWREFORM2, NEWREFORM3 and NEWREFORM4.  With three models 
that vary which other regressors are included (B, C and D); three fixed effects configurations (no 
fixed effects; province fixed effects, labeled “+FE”; and province-plus-year-fixed effects, labeled 
“+FE+YR”), a total of 3x4x3=36 coefficients and their t statistics are presented.   
With the full set of control variables (labeled in Table 7 as Variations on Model D), 
province-years with new reform strategies in effect are associated with a reduction in welfare 
participation of somewhere between 1.91 and 2.72 percentage points when measured in the most 
restrictive definition (i.e., as NEWREFORM1).  Looking only at Alberta, British Columbia, and 
Ontario, a 2-percentage-point reduction in welfare participation (holding constant all other 
macroeconomic and policy variables) would imply that these provinces’ new reform strategies 
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prevented up to 344,000 Canadians per year from participating in the welfare system.   The 
magnitudes and, to a lesser extent, the statistical significance of estimated coefficients on new 
reform strategies shrink as progressively coarser proxies are used (NEWREFORM2 through 
NEWREFOR4).  This suggests that the stringency of implementation and specificity of place and 
time coded in NEWREFORM1 contain important information about the drivers of declines in 
welfare participation. 
New Reform Strategies’ Contribution to Observed Declines in Welfare Participation 
Table 8 presents calculations that facilitate a comparison of the contributions of different 
policy tools in explaining the observed decline in welfare participation rates, analogous to a table 
published by Council of Economic Advisors (1999) about the role of US policies in explaining 
post-1996 declines in US welfare participation.   The first column shows the estimated 
coefficients from Models D, D+FE and D+FE+YR. The second column shows the change in the 
province-population-weighted national average of the right-hand-side factors between 1994 
(when the national participation rate was at its maximum) and 2005 (when participation rates 
have largely reached their lowest levels in decades).  The third column shows the expected 
change in the rate of welfare participation since 1994 based on the observed change in one right-
hand-side factor at a time, computed as the product (or sums of products) of the coefficient in the 
first column and “change in x” listed in the second column.  The Demographics factor depends 
on five coefficients and changes in x variables, and only the sum of these five products are 
reported in the third column of Table 8.  The fourth column translates expected declines into 
counts of the expected number of Canadians not receiving welfare each year attributable to a 
one-factor change equal to that which was actually observed 1994-2005.  The fifth column of 
Table 8 divides the third column (expected change in welfare participation per factor) by the 
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observed -6.4 percentage point decline in Canada’s welfare participation rate (-6.4 = 6.1 percent 
in 2005 minus 12.5 percent in 1994) to compute relative percentages of the observed decline 
attributable to different policy tools. 
The per-factor attribution of  expected percentage declines—to macroeconomic variables, 
new reform strategies, standard tools for controlling welfare participation, labor market policy 
tools, and demographic factors—attempts to provide more finely differentiated evidence that 
addresses the frequently discussed question: following an observed decline in participation rates, 
was it policy, the macroeconomy, or something else?  Table 8 indicates that, depending on the 
model, the policies pursued by new reform users explain 16 to 23 percent of the decline in 
welfare participation during this period.  Declines in the unemployment rate that occurred 
between 1994 and 2005 explain 26 to 39 percent when only contemporaneous unemployment is 
in the model, and 43 to 61 percent of the decline in welfare participation in the 
contemporaneous+two-lag specification.  Overall, it appears that reductions in the 
unemployment rate played the largest role during this period but that, among the five policy tools 
in the encompassing models with a full set of right-hand-side variables, new reform strategies 
had by far the largest effect size.27  Although the percentage decline in participation and absolute 
number of welfare recipients is large and clearly economically significant, the relative effect size 
                                                 
27
 In Model D+FE+YR, coefficients on welfare benefits, eligibility requirements, the minimum wage, and 
unemployment benefits were statistically insignificant , even under conventional assumptions about the distribution 
of the model’s t statistics.    Even in Models D and D+FE, as shown in Appendices C and D, only unemployment 
benefits were statistically significant.  By contrast, across these various models, the variable NEWREFORM1 was 
statistically significant at the 90 percent confidence level, or better. 
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of new reform strategies vis-à-vis the unemployment rate is considerably smaller than effects 
found for similar reform initiatives in the U.S.28   
Which Among New Reform Strategies is Important?  
 Table 9 summarizes three alternative specifications similar to Model D, D+FE and 
D+FE+YR, except that NEWREFORM1 is unbundled into five indicator variables 
corresponding to its policy-tool components.29 These are labeled D’, D’+FE and D’+FE+YR.  
Work requirements are coded as strong and weak versions, labeled WORK_STRONG and 
WORK_WEAK.  And earnings exemptions to incentivize work among welfare recipients is 
unbundled into its two respective components: the threshold defining how much labor market 
earnings are tax-free (labeled as the variable logEARNINGS_THRESH), and the tax rate for 
earnings above this threshold (EARNINGS_TAX).  The disaggregated policy effects in Table 9 
point squarely to work requirements with strong sanctions as being associated with the largest 
reductions in welfare participation.  Although TIMELIMITS is associated with a larger reduction 
in Model D’, the inclusion of province-specific fixed effects makes it disappear, while the effects 
of WORK_STRONG survives all model specifications. 
                                                 
28
 Council of Economic Advisors (1999), for instance, finds that PRWORA accounted for about 36 percent of the 
decline in welfare participation between 1996 and 1998, while the unemployment rate accounted for but 8 percent.  
This is possibly due to the much narrower time period, in contrast to the 13-year period of decline examined here.  
Alternatively, the welfare policy reforms in the US may have been more comprehensive relative to the policies they 
replaced, compared to the new reform strategies of even the most aggressive reformers in Canada. 
29
 The timing of diversion policies was highly correlated with strong work requirements, leading to unstable results.  
Diversion was dropped from the unbundled regression models in Table 9.  Therefore the variable WORK_STRONG 
should be interpreted as a combination of strong work requirements and diversion, since the data do not contain 
enough independent variation in these two components to differentiate their effects.  See Appendix NR for the 
summary statistics of these individual new reform strategies. 
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Sensitivity to Alternative Model Specifications 
A number of alternative model specifications were estimated to check the robustness of 
the findings reported so far.  The first robustness check concerns our main independent variable.  
As shown in Table 7, the different measures of new reform strategies indicate that 
NEWREFORM1 produced the largest and most significant effects.  Table 9 shows that among 
all the new reform strategies considered, it was work requirements with strong sanctions that 
made most of the difference.  Another robustness check on the stability of the main coefficient of 
interest was to include alternative proxies for benefit levels.  Recalling from Table 3 that benefit 
levels are available by province for two other household structures, we re-ran our models to see 
if these alternative benefit measures would make the new reform strategies coefficient shrink in 
magnitude.  We observed no such shrinkage of change in statistical significance. 
Finally, because a time series with a persistent long-run trend can lead to statistical 
anomalies that overstate statistical significance, we adopted the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filtering 
technique, which separates a time series into a trend and residuals (Hodrick and Prescott, 1997).  
We constructed HP-filtered versions of each province’s welfare participation time series, as well 
as all non-binary variables on the right-hand side of the model, and re-estimated the models 
using the HP trends.  The HP trends correlate highly with the original unfiltered time series (as 
one can easily see in the Figures showing HP trends and residual time series in Appendix HP4).  
It is not surprising, therefore, that the results of regressing the HP trend in PARTICIPATION 
using province and year fixed effects were nearly identical to those reported in Table 6.  See 
Appendix H1 for more details.  The coefficients in models with HP trend as the dependent 
variable measure effects on the long-run components of welfare participation apart from short-
run cyclical variation.  We also ran models using the zero-mean HP residuals to see if the policy 
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variables had interesting effects on the short-run cyclical component (according to the HP filter).  
The results are contained in Appendices H2 and H3.   
 
Section 5: Discussion and Interpretation 
This paper contributes a new measure of the changes in welfare policy that appeared in 
Canada in the 1990s based on province-level data collected from a variety of administrative 
sources.  These new reform strategies include work requirements with sanctions, diversion, 
earnings exemptions, and time limits.  It appears that new reform strategies played a larger role 
than other policy variables in reducing welfare participation since the mid 1990s.  Improving 
labor market conditions as measured by provinces’ declining unemployment rates, however, 
accounted for (depending on the empirical model through which the data are viewed) roughly 
two to three times more reduction in welfare participation relative to reductions resulting from 
the implementation of new reform strategies.  The empirical strategy in this paper finely 
differentiates among policy tools that until now have not been included in a single model of 
welfare participation.  Perhaps the most novel comparison to emerge from this fine-grained 
analysis of welfare policy is that the effect of new reform strategies is large relative to eligibility 
requirements and benefit levels, which have received more attention from empirical researchers 
in the past.  Finally, we find some evidence that, among the new policy tools that provinces 
experimented with since the 1990s, work requirements with strong sanctions have the largest and 
most robust effects on welfare participation.   
To our knowledge, this is the first study to collect ministerial source information for all 
provinces to construct a welfare reform measure that encodes the new and oftentimes more 
stringent reform strategies that appeared in Canadian provinces since the 1990s.  This study is 
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also unusual in comparing the relative effect size of particular welfare reform tools considered 
side-by-side in a multivariate environment with macroeconomic variables, labor market policy 
tools, and other welfare reform tools.  This econometric test sets up a “horse race” among four 
competing sources of variation, allowing the data to decide which effect sizes are relatively 
large.   
One limitation of our approach relative to the micro-data studies mentioned earlier is of 
course the information lost in province-level aggregation.  Estimating new reform strategies’ 
effects on particular subpopulations such as immigrants (cf., Baker and Benjamin, 1995), or 
differences in lengths of welfare spells between childless welfare recipients versus parents (cf., 
Barrett and Cragg,1998) requires micro-level data.  Our data, aggregated at the provincial level, 
do contain reasonably good controls for the demographic composition of provinces, although 
province-level data cannot tell us all that we would like to know.  This work will hopefully 
motivate further statistical investigations using micro data and longitudinal data to examine how 
these policies influenced welfare participation among different subpopulations. 
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Province Weak Strong Weak Strong
Alberta 1Jan 1991 - Feb 1993 8Mar 1993 - 16Mar 1993 - Jan 1986 -
British Columbia 2Jan 1996 - Dec2001 9Jan 2002 - 12Jan 1996 - Dec2001 17Jan 2002 - 19Jan 1986 - Dec 1995 20Apr 2002 -
Manitoba 3May 1996 - Jan 1999 -
New Brunswick 4May 1995 - Jan 1996 - Dec 2004
Newfoundland
Nova Scotia 10Aug 2001 - 13Aug 2001 -
Ontario 11Sep 1996 - 18Jun 1996 - Jan 1986 -
Prince Edward Island 5June 1995 - 14April 1995 - Jan 1990 -
Quebec 6Jan 1990 - Sep 1994 Jan 1986 - Dec 1988
Saskatchewan 7Jun 1997 - 15May 2001 - Jan 1989 -
Table 1: New Welfare Reform Strategies by Implementation Date (1986-2005)
Work Requirements with Sanctions Time LimitsEarning ExemptionsDiversion
1
 The Supports for Independence program required welfare participants to look for work or obtain training, and failure to do so resulted in sanctions (NCW, 1992a).  However, these work 
requirements had little practical effect because participants could easily appeal the decision and retain benefits at least on an interim basis while waiting for their appeals to be heard 
(Jeffs, 1993). Therefore, these work requirements are coded as weak.
7
 Under the Saskatchewan Assistance Plan welfare participants are required to set forth a personal transition plan outlining goals and responsibilities that would lead to self-sufficiency 
(Gorlick and Brethour, 1998).  Penalties for noncompliance were reportedly infrequent.  Therefore, these work requirements are coded as weak .
3 Through the Employment and Income Assistance program welfare participants are required to complete an Action Plan that laid out their work-related responsibilities (NCW, 1997). 
Failure to fulfill one's Action Plan resulted in a $50 sanction, which could rise to $100 after six months.  Since benefits cannot be fully eliminated, these work requirements are coded as 
weak.
4
 Under the Family Income Security Act, welfare participants are required to take job training classes, perform a job search, or work (NB, 1995).  Otherwise, they will face a reduction in 
benefits.  Since benefits cannot be fully eliminated, these work requirements are coded as weak.
5
 Under the Social Assistance Act welfare participants are required to look for work, attend school, or take part in job training classes (PEIHSS, 2003). Penalties for noncompliance were 
reportedly infrequent.  Therefore, these reforms are coded as weak.
6
 The Act Respecting Income Security provided welfare participants who engaged in work-related activity a bonus of roughly $100 in additional welfare benefits (NCW, 1997).  Since 
benefits cannot be fully eliminated for non-participation in work-related activities, these "sanctions" are coded as weak.
2 Under the BC Benefits Act welfare participants were required to participate in work-related activity or have their benefits reduced (NCW, 1997).
19
 In addition to 1986-1995, British Columbia again put earnings exemptions in place (temporarily) between 2001 and 2002 (NCW, 2002; 2003).  In 2003, however, the province 
eliminated all earning exemptions (NCW, 2004).  Since then, welfare participants pay 100 percent tax on all labor market earnings. 
17
 The Employment and Assistance Act requires welfare applicants to wait three weeks, during which they were required to attend an orientation session and perform job search before 
gaining eligibility for welfare (BC, 2002).  Also, applicants are not eligible for welfare unless they can show they have worked for two years in succession.
18 Ontario Works mandates that all welfare applicants pursue all other sources of income before eligibility to welfare can be obtained (ONCSS, 2008).  These sources include food banks, 
untapped spousal support, and the liquidation of assets.  Welfare applicants are processed through call centers that put applicants through a screening process.  Documentation 
requirements are extensive. 
20
 In 2002, British Columbia implemented a time limit stipulating that applicants could receive benefits for a maximum of two years out of every five-year period (BC, 2002).  Since that 
time, however, twenty-five classes of individuals have been exempted from such restrictions, including single parents with a child younger than three years of age.
14
 The Social Assistance Act requires that welfare applicants be informed of, and be strongly encouraged to pursue, other forms of assistance, such as Employment Insurance and 
Worker's Compensation benefits, prior to joining welfare (PEIHSS, 2008).
8 The Supports for Independence Program was slowly phased out in favor of the Alberta Works program.  Under Alberta Works welfare participants are required to participate in work 
related activity or face sanctions that either reduced or eliminated benefits (AB, 2009).
12
 The BC Benefits Act expected welfare applicants to have pursued all alternate sources of support before gaining access to welfare (BC, 1999).  The province was also temporarily 
successful in requiring new residents to wait three months before becoming eligible for assistance (NCW, 1997).  Finally, a short-lived pilot program required some districts to subject 
welfare applicants to added screening procedures.  Despite these and other measures, however, the province demonstrated a questionable ability to enforce eligibility requirements, and 
are thus coded as weak .
15 Under the Building Independence umbrella program welfare applicants are now processed through call centers (SK, 2002).  Rather than enroll applicants into welfare immediately, 
callers are alerted to other means of support and, as necessary, diverted to the Jobs First program.  The Job First program provides job training services to applicants and informs them of 
local job opportunities. 
16 Under the Supports for Independence program employable welfare applicants are now required to wait before gaining welfare eligibility (NCW, 1997).  The duration is unspecified 
but applicants may be required to first attend an orientation session before attaining eligibility to welfare.  In addition, case workers have the discretion to deny eligibility for employable, 
single applicants (Boessenkool, 1997).  Also, applicants are required to pursue all other forms of assistance, including liquidating their assets.  Furthermore, case workers have the 
discretion to use funds to meet emergency needs other than through enrollment into welfare, such as providing the cost of transportation for applicants who agreed to move to a 
neighboring province.
13
 Under the Employment Support and Income Assistance Act, welfare applicants are expected to pursue all other "feasible" forms of assistance, such as other government support 
programs like unemployment insurance benefits, child tax credits, and the like (NS, 2008).  If, after evidence provided to case workers suggests the applicant is employable, the applicant 
must show some evidence of job search activity within the past 30 days.  If the caseworker is satisfied that sufficient job search has been undertaken, then the applicant can be admitted 
onto welfare.
9
 The Employment and Assistance Act, which replaces BC Benefits, requires welfare participants to participate in work-related activity or have their benefits reduced by $100 for two 
months (if a family with dependent children), or eliminated entirely (if a single adult) (BC, 2002).
10 The Employment Support and Income Assistance Act requires welfare participants to enter an Employment Action Plan (NS, 2008). The first instance of non-compliance could be 
sanctioned with a loss of benefits for 6 weeks; repeated non-compliance could result in loss of eligibility to welfare.
11
 Under the Ontario Works program welfare participants who do not participate in mandatory work requirements will have their benefits reduced, or cancelled, for three months at the 
first instance of non-compliance (ONCSS, 2008).  This sanction increases to six months for subsequent offenses.
Province
Alberta 5.9 2.0 -3.9 -66.4
British Columbia 11.3 4.2 -7.1 -62.8
Manitoba 9.9 6.4 -3.5 -35.3
New Brunswick 11.6 7.3 -4.4 -37.5
Newfoundland 13.5 11.1 -2.4 -17.6
Nova Scotia 13.5 6.7 -6.8 -50.2
Ontario 14.9 6.3 -8.6 -57.8
Prince Edward Island 11.6 5.9 -5.7 -49.1
Quebec 12.8 8.1 -4.7 -37.0
Saskatchewan 10.0 6.2 -3.8 -37.6
** Canada's national rate of welfare participation peaked in 1994.
Table 2: Changes in Welfare Participation* Rates Among Non-Elderly Canadians from 
1994 to 2005, by Province
Change in 
Percentage 
Points
Percentage 
Change
1994** 
Participation 
Rate
2005 
Participation 
Rate
* Most spells on welfare among Canadians last less than a year.  In British Columbia, 
for example, Barrett and Cragg (1998) found that most welfare spells end within three 
months, and only 10 percent of welfare spells last longer than a year (mostly single 
parents).  By contrast, the authors note that roughly 40 percent of spells on welfare in 
the U.S. last more than two years.
Province
Single, No 
Child
Single Parent, 
One Child
Coupled, Two 
Children
Alberta -17.9 -8.6 -9.3
British Columbia -24.1 -18.2 -17.1
Manitoba -29.9 -6.1 -16.1
New Brunswick -16.4 4.0 12.4
Newfoundland 45.2 -0.2 5.8
Nova Scotia -28.8 -15.5 0.9
Ontario -34.4 -31.2 -30.4
Prince Edward Island -32.6 -12.7 -9.7
Quebec -10.2 -5.8 3.0
Saskatchewan -10.4 -12.3 -11.2
Table 3: Percentage Changes in Real Welfare Benefits from 1994 to 2005, by 
Household Structure*
Common Household Structures
*The label "single" refers to an adult living at an address with no other adults 
and does not imply anything about marital or relationship status.  It is possible 
for a "single" person to be married, unmarried, with a partner, or without, as 
long as those significant others do not reside at the same address.  Similarly, 
"coupled" refers to households with two adults living at the same address.  In 
2005, about 61 percent of adult welfare recipients (excluding those categorized 
as disabled) were single adults with no children; 21 percent were single adults 
with at least one child; and about 10 percent were couples with dependent 
children (HRSDC, 2006).  Finally, although the three household structures 
cover most welfare participants, they are not exhausted and should be treated 
as representative categories.
Province NEWREFORM1 NEWREFORM2 NEWREFORM3 NEWREFORM4
Alberta Mar 1993 - Mar 1993 - Jan 1991 - Apr 1996 -
British Columbia Jan 2002 - Jan 2002 - Jan 1996 - Apr 1996 -
Manitoba May 1996 - Apr 1996 -
New Brunswick May 1995 - Apr 1996 -
Newfoundland Apr 1996 -
Nova Scotia Aug 2001 - Apr 1996 -
Ontario Sep 1996 - Sep 1996 - Sep 1996 - Apr 1996 -
Prince Edward Island Jun 1995 - Jun 1995 - Apr 1996 -
Quebec  Jan 1990 -Sep 1994 Apr 1996 -
Saskatchewan May 2001- Jun 1997- Apr 1996 -
Table 4: Four Versions of NEWREFORM, the Main Explanatory Policy Variable Indicating Province-Specific 
Dates of Implementation
*NEWREFORM1 adopts the strictest and narrowest definition of a new NEWREFORM user, requiring that a 
province has three or more NEWREFORM policies from Table 1 in place, excluding weak work requirements or 
weak diversion, in a given year.  NEWREFORM2 defines NEWREFORM slightly more inclusively, counting 
provinces that have three or more NEWREFORM policies in place, weak or strong, in the same year. 
NEWREFORM3 includes provinces that have adopted any form of work requirement.  NEWREFORM4, the 
crudest and most inclusive measure, simply turns on all province indicators in 1996 marking Canada's federal 
enactment of the CHST.  This instrument is crude in two ways: it does not distinguish among provinces' differing 
policy approaches to welfare NEWREFORM, and it does not account for different timing of policy 
implementation across the provinces.
Variables** Min Mean Median Max Std Dev
Dependent Variable****
PARTICIPATION 1.97 8.97 8.94 15.27 2.74 0.73
Macroeconomic Variables*****
UNEMPLOYMENT 3.90 10.11 9.55 20.10 3.74 0.95
REALGDPGROWTH -4.65 2.53 0.00 15.60 2.48 0.20
Policy Variables ******
NEWREFORM1 0.00 0.13 0.00 1.00 0.34 0.70
NEWREFORM2 0.00 0.24 0.00 1.00 0.42 0.61
NEWREFORM3 0.00 0.42 0.00 1.00 0.49 0.43
NEWREFORM4 0.00 0.49 0.38 1.00 0.49 0.00
logBENEFITS_SINGLE_ONECHILD 9.46 9.64 9.64 10.00 0.10 0.71
logASSET_THRESH 7.07 8.16 8.15 9.35 0.53 0.80
logMINWAGE 1.76 1.94 1.93 2.18 0.09 0.82
logUNEMP_INS 5.62 6.70 6.66 7.92 0.59 0.96
Demographic Variables
SINGLEPARENTS 4.00 6.68 6.72 9.20 0.78 0.33
MIGRATION -2.01 -0.16 -0.14 1.55 0.55 0.79
DROPOUT 7.10 13.64 13.45 23.04 3.53 0.43
ELDERLY 8.85 13.37 13.69 16.04 1.55 0.99
NONPERM_RESIDENTS 0.27 2.72 2.13 10.28 1.84 0.92
***This measure refers to the fraction of each variable's sample variance accounted for by between-province 
variation rather than within-province variation over time.  Most of these between-province variation rates are 
greater than 0.50 and sometimes close to 1, indicating that, for those variables, differences between provinces tend 
to be greater than fluctuations through time.
Table 5: Summary Statistics (N = 200*)
*200 observations are derived from 10 provinces observed at 20 points in time.
******It surprises some observers that, in Canada, single adults with no children (Single, No Child) are eligible for 
welfare.  Childless singles comprise about 61 percent of all Canadian adults on welfare in a given year.  However, 
most of the longer-term and therefore most expensive welfare cases are families with dependent children (single or 
coupled).  To represent benefit levels for each province and in each year, we chose benefit levels for a single parent 
with one child (Single Parent, One Child).  This household structure, or family type, represents about 21 percent of 
all adults on welfare in a given year.  Excluding the province of Newfoundland (whose benefits levels for a Single, 
No Child is an extreme outlier possibly resulting from errors made in data reporting), the pair wise correlation 
between benefit levels for a Single Adult, No Child and Single Parent, One Child is 70.0 percent.  As a result of 
this large overlapping variation, the Single Parent, One Child welfare benefit measure in our empirical models 
serves as a good single-number proxy for benefit fluctuations in general.
**Summary statistics for province fixed effects and year-specific dummy variables included in some versions of the 
model are not presented here.  Inclusion of these dummy variables is indicated in the presentation of regression 
results. 
Between-Province/ 
Total Variance***
*****Lagged versions of the macroeconomic variables, UNEMPLOYMENT and REALGDPGROWTH, are 
included in some regression models reported later.  Summary statistics for lagged variables are not shown because 
lagged and unlagged variables have (nearly) identical univariate distributions.
****PARTICIPATION is the fraction of a province's under-65 population receiving welfare benefits in a particular 
year.  Thus, PARTICIPATION is a rate and its units are percentage points, with a theoretical range of 0 to 100, and 
an empirical range of 1.97 (in Alberta) and 15.27 (in Newfoundland).  We also experimented with transformations 
such as the natural logarithm and even a scaled arctan transformation mapping the unit interval to the entire 
unbounded real line.  These transformations, however, led to greater asymmetry (i.e., greater skewness) in the 
empirical distribution, which increases the influence of observations in the tail of the distribution.  Thus, the raw 
participation rate was the best measure of PARTICIPATION to use as our dependent variable in the analysis.  See 
Appendix P for a more detailed analysis.
Variables A+FE+YR |t| B+FE+YR |t| C+FE+YR |t| D+FE+YR |t|
Macroeconomic Variables
UNEMPLOYMENT 0.46 3.2 0.45 3.6 0.42 3.0 0.46 2.6
UNEMPLOYMENT_{t-1} 0.15 1.0 0.24 1.8 0.22 2.2 0.22 2.3
UNEMPLOYMENT_{t-2} 0.13 0.8 0.05 0.3 0.14 0.9 0.08 0.5
REALGDPGROWTH 0.00 0.0 0.02 0.9 0.01 0.5 -0.01 0.3
REALGDPGROWTH_{t-1} -0.02 0.4 -0.01 0.2 -0.01 0.5 -0.03 1.3
REALGDPGROWTH_{t-2} -0.03 0.5 -0.02 0.3 -0.01 0.3 -0.03 0.7
Policy Variables
NEWREFORM1 -2.16 3.2 -1.92 1.7 -1.91 1.7
logBENEFITS_SINGLE_ONECHILD 3.28 0.7 3.79 0.9
logASSET_THRESH -0.40 0.8 -0.27 0.6
logMINWAGE 2.73 0.8 2.66 0.8
logUNEMP_INS -0.88 0.5 -1.29 0.8
Demographic Variables
SINGLEPARENTS 0.13 0.7
MIGRATION 0.16 0.4
DROPOUT -0.06 0.6
ELDERLY 0.01 0.0
NONPERM_RESIDENTS -0.19 2.2
Constant -0.09 0.0 0.85 0.4 -27.06 0.5 -31.25 0.7
R-Squared 87.0 90.0 90.8 91.3
Estimated coefficients and absolute value t statistics for Models:
Table 6: Regression Results, Province and Year Fixed Effects
|t| |t| |t|
NEWREFORM1 -2.27 1.8 -3.06 3.8 -2.72 2.9
NEWREFORM1+FE -1.56 3.0 -1.79 2.2 -1.88 2.4
NEWREFORM1+FE+YR** -2.16 3.2 -1.92 1.7 -1.91 1.7
NEWREFORM2 -2.38 3.4 -2.37 3.8 -2.49 4.3
NEWREFORM2+FE -1.03 2.4 -0.64 0.9 -1.22 2.0
NEWREFORM2+FE+YR -1.66 2.4 -1.23 1.6 -1.16 1.7
NEWREFORM3 -1.48 3.8 -1.21 3.1 -1.45 1.9
NEWREFORM3+FE -0.22 0.7 -0.13 0.2 -0.63 1.1
NEWREFORM3+FE+YR -1.15 2.2 -0.78 1.6 -0.89 1.9
NEWREFORM4 -0.41 1.0 -0.61 1.3 -1.29 1.4
NEWREFORM4+FE 0.65 1.2 0.34 0.4 -0.87 1.2
NEWREFORM4+FE+YR -0.96 1.4 -0.37 0.3 2.21 1.7
Table 7: Estimated Coefficients on NEWREFORM with Alternate Model Specifications
version of policy variable and 
inclusion of fixed effects*
variations of models B, C and D
*All coefficients in this table are based on versions of Models B, C and D.  The verison label with no 
mention of fixed effects refer to models with no province or year fixed effects.  Versions with the label 
"+FE" have province fixed effects.  Versions with the label "+FE+YR" have both province and year 
fixed effects.  The four versions of the policy variable measuring new reform strategies range from the 
most stringent or restrictive definition (NEWREFORM1) to the most inclusive definition 
(NEWREFORM4) for coding province-years in which new reform strategies are in effect.
Variations 
on Model B
Variations 
on Model C
Variations 
on Model D
**This row repeats the coefficients reported in Table 6 for convenience in comparing effect sizes.
Factor
Contemporaneous Unemployment 0.55 -3.656 -2.02 -551,228 31.4
Unemployment with Two Lags 0.91 -3.656 -3.32 -908,054 51.7
GDP Growth with Two Lags -0.22 -0.017 0.00 1,021 -0.1
New Reform Strategies -2.72 0.534 -1.45 -397,368 22.6
Benefits 3.70 -0.204 -0.75 -205,481 11.7
Asset Exemptions 0.42 -0.720 -0.30 -82,466 4.7
Real Minimum Wage 4.30 -0.021 -0.09 -24,379 1.4
Unemployment Insurance Benefits -3.12 -0.496 1.54 421,970 -24.0
Demographics** . . 0.08 21,767 -1.2Demographics
Contemporaneous Unemployment 0.70 -3.656 -2.54 -694,883 39.6
Unemployment with Two Lags 1.07 -3.656 -3.91 -1,066,869 60.7
GDP Growth with Two Lags -0.14 -0.017 0.00 649 0.0
New Reform Strategies -1.88 0.534 -1.01 -275,161 15.7
Benefits 6.18 -0.204 -1.26 -343,312 19.5
Asset Exemptions 0.28 -0.720 -0.20 -55,084 3.1
Real Minimum Wage 2.24 -0.021 -0.05 -12,710 0.7
Unemployment Insurance Benefits -2.40 -0.496 1.19 324,721 -18.5
Demographics** . . 0.18 49,222 -2.8
Contemporaneous Unemployment 0.46 -3.656 -1.68 -458,486 26.1
Unemployment with Two Lags 0.76 -3.656 -2.77 -756,732 43.1
GDP Growth with Two Lags -0.07 -0.017 0.00 307 0.0
New Reform Strategies -1.91 0.534 -1.02 -279,493 15.9
Benefits 3.79 -0.204 -0.77 -210,662 12.0
Asset Exemptions -0.27 -0.720 0.19 52,254 -3.0
Real Minimum Wage 2.66 -0.021 -0.06 -15,083 0.9
Unemployment Insurance Benefits -1.29 -0.496 0.64 174,836 -10.0
Demographics** . . -0.05 -13,768 0.8
Expected 
Change in 
Welfare 
Participation 
from 1994 to 
2005, Per Factor
Table 8: Per-Factor Contribution* to Observed Declines in Welfare Participation, 1994-2005
Percentage 
Contribution to 
Explaining the 
Observed Decline 
in Welfare 
Participation 
1994-2005
* The relative contribution in the last column of this table is the expected decline in welfare participation (from its peak in 1994 
through 2005, given in the third column) divided by the observed decline in welfare participation in that same period, which was -
6.4 percentage points.  The first column repeats (or, in the case of the factors labeled Longrun Unemployment and Longrun GDP 
Growth and Demographics, computes a simple sum of) coefficients from the respective regression models.  These coefficients are 
interpreted, as always, as the expected change in the annual rate of welfare participation (in units of percentage points on a zero to 
100 scale) conditional on a one-unit change in the right-hand-side variable, generically referred to in the second column label as 
"x."  The second column computes the 2005-province-population-weighted change in each right-hand-side factor (e.g., the 2005 
province-weighted unemployment rate minus the 1994 province-weighted unemployment rate = -3.656).  The change in New 
Reform Strategies of 0.534 is the fraction of Canadians in 2005 living in a province with new reform strategies in place (defined 
by NEWREFORM1) minus the fraction of Canadians in 1994 living in a province with new reform strategies in place.  The third 
is the product of the first two columns, providing the expected decline in the annual rate of welfare participation from the 
coefficient(s) and change per right-hand-side factor.  In the case of the factor Demographics, there are five demographic 
coefficients and five changes in x, which are multiplied with their respective coefficients and then summed to produce the very 
small expected declines in welfare participation in the hundredths of percentage points.  The expected number of Canadians per 
year, per factor, prevented from going onto welfare because of each factor is the expected decline in welfare participation 
translated to a headcount in the 2005 population age 65 and under.  Finally, the contribution to explaining the observed decline of -
6.4 percentage points, attributable to each factor, is the expected decline divided by -6.4.  A negative contribution implies that the 
factor changed in a direction which, all else equal, would have  increased welfare participation.
**The five variables that comprise the Demographics factor are: SINGLEPARENTS, MIGRATION, DROPOUT, ELDERLY, 
NONPERM_RESIDENTS.
OLS
+ Province FE
+ Province + Year FE
Estimated 
Coefficient
Expected 
Number of 
Canadians 
Prevented From 
Collecting 
Welfare Per 
Year, Per Factor
Change in x 
from 1994 to 
2005
Variable
Model D' 
no FE |t|
D'+ 
Province 
FE |t|
D'+ 
Province + 
Year FE |t|
New Reform Strategy
WORK_STRONG -2.20 2.3 -2.05 1.8 2.35 1.8
WORK_WEAK -0.98 1.3 -0.44 0.8 -0.56 1.4
TIMELIMITS -3.37 3.4 -1.29 1.3 -0.15 0.3
logEARNINGS_THRESH 0.17 1.1 -0.09 0.8 0.02 0.2
EARNINGS_TAX 0.01 0.6 0.00 0.3 -0.01 0.8
Other Controls* Yes Yes Yes
Province Effects No Yes Yes
Year Effects No No Yes
R-Squared 78.6 88.2 92.0
* All other macroeconomic, policy, and geographic controls included.  The models in this table all 
include the regressors from Model D except that NEWREFORM1 is unbundled into the five indicators 
shown (indicated by the label Model D'). 
Table 9: Effects of Individual New Reform Strategies on Welfare Participation (Regression Models 
With Disaggregated Version of New Reform Strategies)
Estimated Coefficients and Absolute Value t statistics for 
Figure 1: Time Paths of Welfare Participation, by Province
Maritime Provinces (New Brunswick, Newfoundland, Nova 
Scotia, and Prince Edward Island) Prairie Provinces (Alberta, Manitoba, and Saskatchewan)
Provinces with Large Metropolitan Areas (British Columbia, 
Ontario* and Quebec)
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* The large upward trend in Ontario welfare participation can be traced to a number of factors, including a decision by the province to raise welfare benefit rates every year between 1986 
and 1992, as documented by the National Council of Welfare (1991, 1992).
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